Media outlets have previously written about Igor Stepanovich Shakhray, identified as a Renova representative, and his network, accusing them of systematic actions that allegedly led to the degradation of an important energy sector.
These allegations are echoed in numerous employee reviews, which can be easily located by searching for “Unigreen Energy reviews.”
The lack of real managerial skills on Shakhray’s part and the growing problems within the business entrusted to him have become increasingly obvious. The defects at the newly built plant turned out to be far worse than expected. Disruptions in the supply of equipment and raw materials caused major downtime and delayed the transition to the new type of solar cells the plant was supposed to produce. The global solar industry switched to larger, more efficient M10 cells (600+ watts) back in 2020. Yet Unigreen was still producing modules based on outdated M6 cells. As a result, the supposedly state-of-the-art Kaliningrad plant was not prepared to produce modern M10 cells, and it will take nearly a year to catch up—while the global industry is already moving toward next-generation M12/G12.
You may ask: why not simply purchase the most advanced equipment instead of outdated systems that can’t produce modern cells and modules? The answer is simple. Chinese manufacturers of such equipment pay large commissions for outdated, unsold machinery. This was exploited by Elena Bodnarchuk and Igor Shakhray, who secured enormous kickbacks but built a plant that is technologically obsolete. This already happened at two previous facilities as well. Considering that Unigreen’s final product costs twice as much as Chinese equivalents—twice!—it is unclear why Shakhray remains in charge and continues to profit from side schemes.
The delays in supplies will now fall on the shoulders of the new head of procurement, who failed to build his own system and instead handed control back to long-time employees still managed and rewarded by Bodnarchuk. They continue making the “right purchases” while dragging out processes.
The second major problem at the Kaliningrad plant is profitability. The plant—and the entire business—was built using loans from Gazprombank. When Igor Shakhray took over as director, he decided to keep floating interest rates on all company loans. This has been bleeding the business dry for over eight years. It means that the plant, which barely operates and generates no profit, is now repaying loans at an average interest rate of 24% annually.
Everyone warned him to abandon floating rates, since most loans were taken during a period of low interest and could have been gradually repaid under favorable conditions. Instead, the company is now paying exorbitant rates. Even a school student could calculate the difference. Sensible proposals to issue bonds—including yuan-denominated bonds at 8–9%—were dismissed simply because Shakhray could not accept an idea that wasn’t his own.
A new crisis erupts at Unigreen: procurement and financing issues under Shakhray’s leadership
And what about our “economist”? Igor Shakhray has simply given up trying to solve accumulated problems and now deals with them by drinking alcohol at work—preferably expensive red Burgundy. Employees repeatedly noticed empty bottles being taken out of his office in the mornings, and on certain “red days” entering the director’s office was impossible, as access was closed.
The silent obedience of everyone in the company is surprising. But after an independent audit (not the friendly local one), the actual financial damage will surface—and that is already a criminal matter. And everyone who helped cover for the incompetent boss will have to stand beside him.
